Case Name:
Briggs v. Grounds , 9 Cir , Case #: 10-16683 Opinion Date: 6/15/2012 , DAR #: 7952
Case Holding:
On federal habeas review of a Batson/Wheeler issue, the reviewing court must defer to the state court's conclusion that there was no purposeful discrimination unless the state appellate court was objectively unreasonable in finding that the trial court's credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. At appellant's trial, the prosecutor used 18 of her 20 peremptory challenges to strike three African-American prospective jurors and 15 non-African-American prospective jurors. The defense objected, claiming the challenges were racially motivated. The trial court found the prosecutor exercised her challenges for "non-race based reasons and they are valid." The reasons included juror demeanor; requirement for additional evidence to convict; and inclination to hold the prosecution to a higher standard. The state appellate court considered comparative jury analysis in conjunction with its review of the individual jurors and found that substantial evidence supported the finding that the challenges were not race based. [With comparative analysis, if a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking an African-American panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar non-African-American who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.] The federal appellate court considered whether the state appellate court reasonably determined that the defendant had not established "purposeful discrimination." In review, a federal habeas court can grant the petition only if it was unreasonable for the state court to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge. The state-court factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, a review of the voir dire and the juror questionnaires by the federal court failed to reveal purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution in exercising peremptory challenges to strike the three African-American jurors.
Case Name:
People v. Aldana , District: 4 DCA , Division: 3 , Case #: G040320 Opinion Date: 6/13/2012 , DAR #: 7851
Case Holding:
A public officer may not be convicted of knowingly keeping false accounts if the discrepancies in records were not materially false. Matney, a county hospital administrator, and Aldana, a county contract doctor who also performed administrative services, were both convicted of violating Penal Code section 424, subdivision (a)(3), which prohibits those charged with the control over the expenditure of public moneys from keeping false accounts or making false entries into accounts. Matney filled out and signed Aldana's time sheets, which he signed and gave to her as blank forms. When completed, they did not accurately reflect the specific hours he worked. Aldana's conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence because he had no control over the disbursement of public funds and because he did not make any entry on his timesheet. Matney's conviction was reversed because the felony includes a materiality element. The false entries did not result in any loss or misappropriation of county funds or result in unjust enrichment. There was no evidence that Aldana worked less than the hours recorded. In fact, Aldana worked more hours than recorded, so the technically inaccurate time sheets were not materially false.
Case Name:
Gomez v. Superior Court (Felker) , CalSup , Case #: S179176 Opinion Date: 6/18/2012 , DAR #: 8065
Case Holding:
Code of Civil Procedure section 259, subdivision (a) authorizes a court commissioner to determine ex parte writ petitions; the statute is constitutional. Two inmates filed petitions for writ of mandate seeking an order directing the prison to process administrative appeals of grievances. A court commissioner denied the petitions. In the Court of Appeal, the inmates challenged the commissioner's jurisdiction and the court concluded that the commissioner had authority to deny the petitions. The California Supreme Court affirmed. The plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 259, subdivision (a) authorizes court commissioners to grant or deny ex parte petitions for writs of habeas corpus and alternative writs. The reference in subdivision (a) to a "motion" is a broad term that includes petitions for alterative writs or writs of habeas corpus because a writ petition may fairly be described as an application for an order, which is the definition of a "motion." The authority to "hear and determine" a matter is a grant of subject matter jurisdiction and includes the authority to deny a requested writ. The constitutional authority of commissioners to perform "subordinate judicial duties" includes the decision to summarily deny an ex parte petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus. The limitations applied to writ proceedings (i.e., In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767; federal exhaustion and procedural default rules) do not negate a commissioner's authority under the present circumstances. This is not akin to a judicial proceeding because no hearing or other input from the respondent is required. It was unnecessary for the court to decide whether assigning a commissioner to a case that challenged a criminal conviction or asserted grounds for release from confinement would be constitutional.
Case Name:
People v. Brown , CalSup , Case #: S181963 Opinion Date: 6/18/2012 , DAR #: 8122
Case Holding:
Prospective application of the January 25, 2010 amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which increased the rate at which qualified inmates accrued presentence custody credits, is consistent with Legislative intent. "For eight months during 2010, a now superceded version of section 4019" increased the rate at which qualified inmates accrued presentence conduct credits. Under Penal Code section 3, penal laws are prospective unless the Legislature's intent to do otherwise is clear. The January 25, 2010 version of section 4019 contained no express declaration it was to be applied retroactively and no such implication arises from extrinsic sources (i.e., legislative history). Nor may retroactivity be inferred from the state’s fiscal emergency that prompted the legislation; the method the Legislature chose to deal with the emergency still involved an increased incentive for good behavior to receive the enhanced credits. Because the January 25, 2010 version of section 4019 applies prospectively, inmates whose presentence custody spanned before and after January 25, will receive credits at two different rates. The rule of People v. Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (when Legislature reduces penalty for a crime the reduction applies in all cases not yet final) does not apply here because former section 4019 does not alter the penalty for a crime - it addresses future conduct by providing increased incentive for good behavior.
Prospective only application of former section 4019 does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. "The important correctional purposes of a statute authorizing incentives for good behavior [citations omitted] are not served by rewarding prisoners who served time before the incentive took effect. . . ." Conduct credits must apply prospectively to motivate good behavior. Thus, prisoners who served time before and after former section 4019 was effective are not similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Case Name:
Williams v. Illinois , USSup , Case #: 10-8505 Opinion Date: 6/18/2012 , DAR #: 8091
Case Holding:
The confrontation clause does not prohibit disclosure of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements in a DNA laboratory report through testimony by an expert who did not prepare the report. In petitioner's bench trial for rape and other offenses, an expert testified over a confrontation clause objection, based on a DNA profile that had been produced by an outside laboratory (Cellmark), that petitioner's DNA contained in a computer data bank matched the DNA profile found in semen samples taken from the victim. In a fractured decision (four-one-four), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the disclosure of Cellmark's out-of-court statements through expert testimony did not violate the confrontation clause. A majority (J. Thomas and the plurality) concluded that the statements in the Cellmark report were nontestimonial but for different reasons. Justice Thomas concluded that Cellmark's report was nontestimonial because it lacked the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition. According to the plurality, the clause prohibits use of out-of-court statements that have the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of a criminal offense. Such statements are generally formalized in some manner (i.e., depositions, affidavits, confessions). Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report was to assist police in apprehending a rapist; it was not created to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. The dissent disagreed, concluding that the analyst who generated Cellmark's report became a witness whom the petitioner had a right to confront when the state introduced the substance on the report into evidence through an expert witness. [Editor's note: Footnote 5 of Justice Thomas' decision states that the confrontation clause also reaches the use of technically informal-statements when used to evade the formalized process.]
Out-of-court statements in a DNA laboratory report that are introduced to explain the basis of an expert's opinion are introduced for their truth. A majority of the court (J. Thomas and the dissent) held that expert basis testimony is admitted for its truth and may implicate the confrontation clause. Both Justice Thomas and the dissent concluded that there is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so the fact finder may evaluate an expert's opinion and disclosing the statement for its truth. To determine the validity of the expert's opinion, the fact finder must assess the truth of the out-of-court statements on which it relies. Here, the expert's opinion that petitioner's DNA profile matched the DNA profile derived from the victim's vaginal swabs relied on Cellmark's out-of-court statements that the profile it reported was in fact derived from the victim's swabs and not another source. The validity of the expert's opinion ultimately turned on the truth of Cellmark's statements. The plurality disagreed, concluding that statements from the Cellmark report were not admitted for their truth. The plurality did acknowledge, however, that the dissent's argument would have force if the petitioner had a jury trial instead of a bench trial. Had this been a jury trial, the portion of the expert's testimony that identified the DNA profile as having been found in semen from the victim's vaginal swabs would have been objectionable because a jury could have viewed this testimony as proof that the DNA profile was derived from a sample taken from the victim.
Case Name:
People v. Little , District: 4 DCA , Division: 3 , Case #: G045157 Opinion Date: 6/15/2012 , DAR #: 7965
Case Holding:
Burglary is first degree even though the residents are away from home while their realtor conducts an open house. Appellant and his codefendant entered a house that was being shown by a realtor and stole property. Appellant argued that during the open house, the home was being used exclusively for commercial purposes, thus there was insufficient evidence of first degree burglary. Affirmed. A house need not have someone present to be inhabited - all that is required is that someone live there.
Appellant may be impeached with theft prior where he elicits exculpatory hearsay evidence. Appellant was charged with second degree burglary based on his codefendant's entry of a Target store and use of the theft victim's credit card. Appellant's attorney elicited a statement from a testifying officer regarding appellant's exculpatory statement that was made during a traffic stop. As a consequence, the court allowed in evidence of appellant's prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes. (Evid. Code, § 1202.) He challenged admission of his prior because he did not testify. Affirmed. A defendant's prior felony convictions are admissible under Evidence Code sections 1202 and 788 to attack his credibility when, at his request, his exculpatory statements to police are admitted into evidence but the defendant does not testify. (Citing with approval People v. Jacobs (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1444.) Appellant cannot avoid a challenge to his credibility by eliciting exculpatory hearsay evidence without testifying.
Case Name:
People v. Rangel , District: 1 DCA , Division: 5 , Case #: A132664 Opinion Date: 6/14/2012 , DAR #: 7938
Case Holding:
Where defendant's smartphone contains information that is the "functional equivalent" of items listed in a warrant, a search of defendant's text messages is included within the scope of the warrant. After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, appellant pled guilty to participation in a criminal street gang and other offenses. He appealed the search of text messages contained in his cell phone that yielded inculpatory evidence. Affirmed. Officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant, which authorized a search for telephone lists and gang indicia, when they searched appellant's contacts in his cell phone. The data contained in the cell phone was the functional equivalent of the items particularly described in the warrant. A smartphone has the capacity to store data such as names, telephone numbers, artwork and other information, all of which may amount to gang indicia. As such, the phone was a likely container for items that were the functional equivalent of those specified in the warrant. The warrant extended to the text messages because the phone was validly seized and there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the gang-related crime would be found in the messages. The court did not decide whether the results would be different if the text messages pertained to criminal conduct that was not gang-related or connected to the crime being investigated.
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